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Summary: The World Trade Organisation General 
Council established the W T O  Committee on Trade 
and Environment on 31 Janz1ar.y 1995. The 
predecessors of this Committee are the GA TT group 
on Environmental Meas~lres and International Trade 
and the Sub-Committee on Trade and Environment of 
the Preparatory Committee of the World Trade 
Organisation. The W T O  Committee has already 
discussed a wide range of issues involved in the 
6 d  greening" of free tmde. Its work rejlects the 
deJinition of environmental protection as constitlating 
an element of global free trade. 
Work on this article was completed on 1 August 
1995. 
1. Introduction 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Committee on 
Trade and Environment, established by the WTO General 
Council (31 January 1995), held its first meeting on 16 
February 1995. 
The Committee was created to formalise a process which 
has been taking place for some time w~th in  the forum of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), namely 
the reconciliation of the legitimate concerns for environ- 
mental protection with the establishment of a global free 
trade regime. 
This article seeks: 
1. to define the origin of the Committee: 
2. to examine briefly the issues dealt with so far by the 
Committee; and 
3. to consider what role this Committee may play in the 
debate on  the "greening" of free trade. 
national Trade (EMIT) was established in November 1971 
by decision of the General Council. It was given the task of 
examining, upon request, any specific matters relevant to the 
trade policy aspects of measures to control pollution and 
protect the human environment.' It was to report back to 
the Council. 
EMIT did not become active until October 1991. This 
gap between the establishment of the EMIT group and its 
eventual realisation illustrates the importance attached to 
the issue in the 1990s. Three items were dealt with (TE 001, 
01.04.1993, p.6): 
I .  trade provisions in existing multilateral agreements 
(MEAs) vis-a-vis GATT principles and provisions; 
2. the transparency of trade-related environmental measures; 
3. the possible trade effects of packaging and labelling 
requirements. 
The chairman of EMIT concluded that the group proved 
useful as a forum for the exchange of information. In his 
view, the group had reached two important conclusions: 
1. The delegations seemed convinced that the GATT 
agreement offered room for environmental considera- 
tions, either within the GATT rules o r  as an exception to 
those rules. This statement answered the concerns of 
some environmentalists that the GATT, by its nature 
(being an agreement promoting free trade and fair 
competition), cannot offer a sufficient framework to 
meet environmental concerns. 
2. Delegations stressed that GATT does not seek to impose 
its free trade goals over environmental protection, nor to 
boycott international initiatives in protecting the global 
environment. This statement reflects a commitment to 
multilateralism in responding to the environmental 
challenges of international trade. 
2.2 The Trade and Environment Decision of 14 April 1994 
In adopting the Uruguay Round Final Act in Marrakech on 
15 April 1q94, ~ i n i i t e r s  agreed to insert a decision on trade 
and environment. 
This decision called for the establishment of a WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment. It also included the 
Committee's terms of reference, which give it a broad 
assignment. Within the framework of the terms of reference, 
any relevant issue may be raised. 
However broad the agenda. there is a limit, due to the 
nature of the WTO. Ministers stated a wish for the 
Committee to  co-ordinate policies in the field of trade and 
environment, without exceeding the competence of the 
multilateral trading system, which is limited to trade policies 
and those trade-related aspects of environmental policiy 
which may result in significant trade effects for members.- 
The Ministerial decision calls on the Committee to ensure 
the input of inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations referred to in Article V of the WTO. 
2.  From EMIT to the Trade and 
Environment Decision of "1 April 1. Interim report by the Chairman of EMIT, 3 December 1992, TE 
1994 001, 01.04.1993, p.6. The WTO (previously GATT) secretariat 
regularly issues documents on the trade and the environment 
aspects of the GATT. These documents will be cited in this article 
2.1 The GATT group on Environmental Measures and as "TE (No), (date)". 
International Trade 2. See the text of the ministerial decision as published in TE 002, 
The G A T T  group on Environmental Measures and Inter- 08.05.1995, p.7 onwards. 
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The Committee was to submit its report to the WTO 
Environmental Conference, to be held in Singapore in mid- 
December 1996. 
2.3 The Sub-committee on Trade and Environment 
Given the relative success of the EMIT group, ministers 
were convinced that, prior to the first General Council of 
the WTO, a forum had to be created in which the 
consultations on trade-related environmental issues could 
be pursued. Therefore, it was decided to set up a Sub- 
Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the World 
Trade Organisation. 
This sub-committee held five meetings pending the 
establishment of the WTO Committee. These meetings dealt 
with the following matters (TE 002, 08.05.1995, p.3 et seq): 
1. organisational matters. These included inviting the 
secretariats of the UN, UNEP, FAO, ITC, UNDP, 
OECD, EFTA, The Commission on Sustainable Devel- 
opment, IMF, UNCTAD and the World Bank to 
observe its work. These inter-governmental bodies have 
also been granted observer status within the Committee 
on Trade and Environment (infra); 
2. the relationship between the provisions of the multi- 
lateral trading system and - 
(a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes, and 
(b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to 
products, including standards and technical regula- 
tions, packaging, labelling and recycling; 
3. the relationship between the provisions of the multi- 
lateral trading system and trade measures for environ- 
mental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral 
environmental agreements; 
4. the effect of environmental measures on market access. 
especially in relation to the least developed among them, 
and environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions 
and distortions. 
3. The WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment 
3.1 Structure 
The first General Council of the WTO established the 
Committee on Trade and Environment on 31 January 1995. 
The Committee is open to all members of the WTO: 
other signatories of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round 
that are Contracting Parties to the GATT 1947 and eligible 
to  become original members of the WTO; and other 
governments with observer status. 
The eleven inter-governmental institutions that obtained 
observer status under the Sub-committee on Trade and 
Environment keep this status in the Committee. So far, no 
arrangements have been made to meet the requirement of 
the Ministerial Decision to allow observer status to non- 
governmental organisations. 
The latter issue has proved complex. As became apparent 
in the Sub-committee on Trade and the Environment (TE 
010, 11.10.1994, p. 9 et seq), there is agreement on the 
principle that NGOs should participate.3 However. no 
consensus has emerged on the extent or manner of such 
involvement. 
The task for the Committee is to promote transparency 
and use the expertise and information of the NGOs, at  the 
same time avoiding delays and maintaining principles of 
democracy. All that has been achieved towards transpar- 
ency is that it has been agreed to provide NGOs and other 
interested persons with reports of the meetings and the 
preparatory work of the Committee. 
N o  consensus has been reached so far on a number of 
other issues. Should NGOs be allowed to observe - or to 
participate in - the actual sessions of the Committee, or does 
this endanger the specific needs and characteristics of  a 
negotiation process? Should the issue of transparency be 
resolved at  a national level4 or  a t  the level of the WTO itself, 
as with other international organisations, such as the World 
Bank or the OECD? 
Thus, the participation of NGOs remains to be resolved. 
Consultations on this subject are currently taking place in 
the WTO General Council. 
3.2 The Committee's Agenda 
The Committee adopted the following agenda items (TE 002 
08.05.1995, Appendix 2. These items form part of the terms 
of reference provided by the Ministerial Decision on trade 
and environment): 
1 .  the relationship between the provisions of the multi- 
lateral trading system and trade measures for environ- 
mental  purposes,  including those pursuant  t o  
multilateral environmental agreements; 
2. the relationship between environmental policies rele- 
vant to trade and environmental measures with 
significant trade effects and the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system: 
3. the relationship between the provisions of the multi- 
lateral trading system and - 
(a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes, and 
(b) requirements for environmental purposes relating 
to products, including standards and technical 
regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling: 
4. the provisions of the multilateral trading system with 
respect to the transparency of trade measures used for 
environmental purposes and environmental measures 
and requirements which have significant trade effects; 
3. This principle has also been recognized in other international 
fora. Article 71 of the 1945 Charter of thc United Nations 
recognises the legitimacy of involving NGOs in international 
activities. Chapter 27 of Agenda 21 seeks to reinforce the role of 
KGOs, defining them as partners in achieving sustainable devel- 
opment and urging the signatories to invite NGOs to take part in 
the formulation of policies and implementation of development 
programs. Chapter 38 of Agenda 21 similarly calls on international 
organisations to involve NGOs in their work. 
4. India suggests (TE 010. 11.10.1994, p.10) that the input of NGOs 
should be achieved by giving them the means to try and influence 
the point of view of their government. Transparency by way of 
public participation of NGOs in the WTO policy-making process at 
the level of the WTO itself, in the view of India, risks politicizing 
the WTO, which is not just a forum for interchanging ideas, but an 
international organisation with far reaching decision-making power 
and advanced dispute settlement procedures. 
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5. the relationship between the dispute settlement 
mechanisms in the multilateral trading system and 
those found in multilateral agreements; 
6. the effect of environmental measures on market access, 
especially in relation to  developing countries, in 
particular the least developed among them, and 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions 
and distortions; 
7 .  exports of domestically prohibited goods; 
8. Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); 
9. services; 
10. appropriate arrangements for relations with non- 
governmental organisations referred to in Article V of 
the W T O  and transparency of documentation. 
This agenda recycles some of the issues that have been 
addressed already in the EMIT group. 
3.3 Issues That Have Already Been Discussed 
3.3.1 E:cports of Domestically Prohibiteci Goods 
The issue of domestically prohibited goods (DPGs) concerns 
the treatment of goods whose sale and use is restricted in the 
domestic market because they present a danger to human, 
animal or plant life or health or the environment, but which 
nevertheless may be exported to  other countries (TE 001, 
22.03.1995, p. 1). 
Sri Lanka and Nigeria brought this issue up in 1982. 
Subsequently, a G A T T  working group was set up, which 
produced a report on the matter in 199 1 (Draft Decision on 
Trade in Banned or Severely Restricted Products and Other 
Hazardous Substances). This report did not find sufficient 
support for it to be adopted. 
The Committee observed that matters had evolved since 
that report had been published, notably there had been 
some initiatives in international environmental agreements 
and instruments: 
1. The Second Meeting of the Basel Convent~on's Con- 
ference of the parties had decided to ban exports of 
hazardous wastes from OECD to non-OECD countries 
(for final disposal. immediately; and for recycling and 
recovery, as of January 1998). 
2. Resolution 3 of the 1989 Base1 Conference called on the 
Executive Director of UNEP to establish an ad hoc 
working group of experts to develop elements that might 
be included in a protocol on liability and compensation 
for damage resulting from the transboundary movement 
of (hazardous) wastes and their disposal. This group was 
succeeded by a similar group set up by decision of the 
first Conference of the Parties to the Base1 Convention 
(prolonged by the second conference). 
3. Finally, the Committee draw attention to the negotia- 
tions under the London Guidelines on Banned or  
Severely Restricted Chemicals to  make the Prior 
Informed Consent (PIC) procedures legally binding.5 
Given these initiatives, the question of the role of the WTO 
in tackling the problem of DPGs was raised. It was recalled 
that the W T O  does not have the mandate to review national 
environmental priorities, to set environmental standards o r  
to develop global policies on the environment. The WTO 
Committee was not set up to undermine or duplicate work 
done in international environmental fora. 
Most members of the Committee expressed the opinion 
that what the WTO can accomplish in this area is greater 
transparency of those national environmental policies 
banning goods internally while at  the same time allowing 
them to be exported. Here again it was underlined that, 
notwithstanding future initiatives, there already exists a 
wide range of measures within the WTO to secure 
transparency of trade measures. 
However, it seems that the European Union wishes to 
assign a larger mandate to the WTO in this area. The 
representation of the European Union said consideration 
might be given to taking complementary action in the WTO, 
as a safety net. if reinforcement of rules in other fora was felt 
to be necessary (TE 001 22.03.1995, p.4). If this means that 
the WTO trade rules would be used as a safety net for failing 
or non-existing rules, then this idea is not revolutionary, but 
would be a mere application of the rules of international 
public law. However, if the European Union is considering a 
specific set of environmental standards within the WTO, 
then this line of thinking represents a substantial change in 
the character of the WTO rules. 
Concerning the question of compatibility of DPGs with 
the existing GATT rules, several delegations noted the 
possibility, offered by Article XX of the GATT,  of 
restricting imports where it was felt necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health. Yet there would be a 
problem if decisions on restricting trade were taken by 
exporting countries alone. This would raise the issue of 
extra-jurisdictional action. 
Discussions on this topic were concluded by the 
suggestion that establishing a working group might prove 
useful. 
3.3.2 The R~elutionship Betrveen the ~W~iltilc~teral Trading 
Systetn and Et~vironmentezl Meczs~rres 
The relationship between the provisiorls of the multilateral 
trading system and trade measures for environmental 
purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environ- 
mental agreements (MEAs), has already been on the 
Committee's agenda. It has not been discussed thoroughly, 
although it attracted wide attention both in the EiMIT group 
and in the Uruguay Round Preparatory Committee on 
Trade and Environment (TE 0 1 1, 06.0 1.1994, p. 4 er seq) 
This item goes to the heart of the trade and the 
environment question, embracing the discussions on Trade 
Related Environmental Measures (TREMs)  pursued 
through international agreements, and T R E M s  taken 
unilaterally. 
5. See Demaret. P., "TREMs, Multilateralism and the GATT" in 
Cameron, J.. Demaret, P, and Geradin, D. (eds.), Trade and Tile 
Environment: The Searclz for Bal'znce. London, Cameron May, 
1994, Vol.1, (p.52) p.54. The Prior Informed Consent system was 
jointly set up by the UNEP and the F A 0  in the context of the 
shipment of dangerous chemicals that are either banned or strictly 
controlled on the domestic market of exporting countries. 
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3.3.2.1 TRE:Ms in lnternufiotial Agreements 
The international community supports multilateral action 
rather than unilateral initiatives. Both the Rio ~ec la ra t ion"  
and the Rio Convention on Climate Change7 say explicitly 
that international co-operation needs to be promoted to 
tackle transboundary environmental problems. The belief in 
multilateral co-operation as the most effective way to solve 
global and transboundary environmental problems has been 
expressed in the meetings of the Committee and of its 
predecessors. Not only does a common approach promise to 
be more successful, it also discourages unilateral measures. 
A number of international environmental agreements 
include TREMs.  The most important are the 1973 
Washington Convention on International Trade in Endan- 
gered Species (CITES); the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; and the 1989 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move- 
ments of Hazardous wastes and their ~ i s ~ o s a l . '  
There are relatively few TREMs in international envir- 
onmental agreements and few complaints from countries 
which have been made subject to them. This may lead some 
to believe that it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie. 
However. it could prove more rewarding to examine such 
agreements now, rather than when conflicts ac t~~a l ly  arise. 
Cozlntrie.~ Par& to  Both tlze bVTO aticl the lMEA 
The international legal order does not have any problem 
with the compatibility of TREMs in MEAs and the GATT 
principles vis-a-vis parties to both treaties. Indeed. accord- 
ing to the Vienna Treaty on the law of treaties. contracting 
parties to the GATT may agree that certain provisions of 
the GATT will not apply in their niutuai relationship."n 
the EMIT-group, participants acknowledged that a later 
and more specific agreement takes precedence over an 
earlier agreement, provided that the agreements address the 
same subject matters (TE 01 . 01.04.1993, p.8). 
Not all MEAs meet the conditions for the 1e.v specialis 
~terogat legi generuli.~ rule, or the 1e.y posterior clerognr lrgi 
priori rule to apply. If a treaty orders the parties to take 
measures towards the environmental goal that has been set. 
without defining the specific measures to be taken. then it 
seems justified to let the normal set of GATT checks and 
balances do their work to exclude protectionist measures.'" 
Looking at the GATT in isolation. the compatibility of 
the trade measures of MEAs with GATT articles was not 
guaranteed.' ' 
Import restrictions as with the Basel Convention are 
compatible with Article IT1 of the GATT (the national 
treatment principle) only in so far as they coincide with 
internal domestic restrictions. This means that as far as the 
GATT is concerned, TREMs taken pursuant to MEAs to 
protect environmental goals situated outside the state's 
jurisdiction; are deemed to be incolnpatible with Article 111. 
Under the same circumstances, export restrictions are 
incompatible with Article XI (prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions). 
The exceptions provided for in Article XX (b) and (g) of 
the GATT could not be invoked until very recently.12 The 
second Tuna/Dolphin Panel, however, seems to have left 
aside the restrictive interpretation of Article XX (b) and 
(g).'3 
Thus, at the moment, the GATT does not seem to 
challenge any longer the legality of TREMs enacting MEAs, 
vis-a-vis parties to the treaty concerned. 
Countries Party to tile W T O  but not to tlie M E A  
Trade measures against non-parties to the MEA concerned 
generally are adopted to avoid "free-riders" and to 
encourage countries to adhere to the MEA. 
It is said, however, that there are more effective means to 
try and meet the environmental objective set in the MEA, 
such as technological and financial assistance. This con- 
sideration is important in case the exception(s) in Article XX 
of the GATT are triggered. Indeed, as has been underlined 
in several GATT Panel Reports, one of the conditions to be 
met by trade measures to qualify as an exception under 
Article XX is that there are no less restrictive measures that 
are equally effectwe in attaining the policy goal. 
A number of countries drew attention to the fact that 
there might be good reasons for a state not to accede to an 
MEA. A state may consider that the environmental problem 
has a low priority. or that the scientific evidence of the 
6. Principle I? of the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on  Environment 
and Development: ". . . Unilateral actions to deal with environ- 
mental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country 
should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing trans- 
boundary or  global environmental problems should, as far as 
possible, be based on an international consensus". 
7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
article 3(5): "The parties should cooperate to promote a supportive 
and open international economic system that would lead to 
sustainable economic growth and development in all parties . . . 
thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate 
change . . .". 
8. In CITES. trade between parties and non-parties to the 
Convention is being made subject to the same restrictive regime 
as apppiies to trade between parties to the Convention. The 
Montreal Protocol includes a regime for trade between parties and 
non-parties which is stricter than that applying to trade among 
parties: see article 4 of the Protocol. The Basel Convention controls 
trade with non-parties more stringently than it regulates trade 
among parties. It even foresees a complete ban on trade with non- 
parties, subject of course to the condition that the goods concerned 
fall within the scope of the Convention: see article 4 (5). 
9. See, ir.r/er nlici, articles 30 and 59 of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. 
10. Compare this with the situation in which a treaty allows the 
parties to take measures that are more extensive than is explicitly 
mentioned in the treat) (e.g. article XIV of CITES). In this case, 
notwithstanding the uncertain extent of those measures that are not 
taken by all parties. u priori the parties to the convention did agree 
on the principle Duru l r .~ ,  seci l e s ,  pncta sunt servandri. Contra, see 
Demaret, P., op. cit., p.56. 
11. See Demaret. P.. op. cit.. p.55. 
12. The exception in Article XX (b) required that the protection of 
human, plant o r  animal health be at stake withln the state's 
jurisdiction: see the GATT Panel Report on  United States 
Restrictions on  Imports of Tuna, 16.08.1991, at  5.26. Recourse 
could be had to Article XX (g) only if the T R E M s  concerned 
assisted domestic measures: ibidem, 5.27. 
13. GATT Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports 
of Tuna,  06.1994. at  5.20. See Cameron, J., in the addendum to his 
introduction to Trucie trrlci the E/iviron~nent: The Searcli.for Bczicznce. 
Cameron. J . ,  Demaret. P. and Geradin, D .  (eds.), London, 
Cameron May. 1994. Vol.1, p.15 et st2([. 
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problem is not adequate, or that the associated costs are not 
affordable. Developing countries might find support in 
Principle 6 of the Rio ~ec1aration'"f they consider that a 
particular MEA has not taken their specific (financial and1 
or  economic) problems into account. National sovereignty is 
another argument against the use of trade measures as a 
means to force countries to  join the treaty. 
At first sight there seem to be overwhelming arguments 
that trade restrictive measures vis-a-vis non-parties are 
incompatible with the GATT agreement. 
If the parties to the MEA are obliged to apply the same 
restrictive trade regime towards non-parties as they do 
towards parties. then this amounts to the inversion of the 
most-favoured nation clause (Article I GATT)." If they 
have to apply an even more restrictive regime, then the 
discrimination is loud and clear (violation of Article I 
GATT). 
The obvious problem that the GATT has with MEAs 
discredits the GATT, according to some environmentalists. 
They claim that, since the G A T T  was established to 
promote and to protect fair trade. it will never be able to 
deal with trade measures aimed a t  solving global environ- 
mental concerns. Therefore, in their view. the GATT should 
be re-written. "Modern" interpretations of GATT principles 
and exceptions are not enough, according to these critics. 
Despite such incompatibility with basic GATT princi- 
ples, a number of countries have invoked various reasons to 
justify the application of trade measures to non-parties:'6 
1. Reference is made to the global character of the 
environmental interests a t  stake. The importance of the 
challenge would thus justify stringent measures, including 
overt discrimination, in seeking maximum support for 
the MEAs concerned. 
2. The GATT code on public procurement entails, as with 
the MEAs concerned, the non-application of the most 
favoured nation principle vis-d-vis states that d o  not wish 
to accede to these sectoral agreements. If this practice is 
considered to be justified in the name of free trade, then 
this should also be possible to preserve the global 
environment. 
3. Trade measures vis-d-vis third states should be justified 
because and as far as the parties to the treaty protect their 
own environment. 
If the contracting parties to  the WTO were to on the 
necessity for trade measures even though they would be 
incompatible with G A T T  principles, a way has to  be found 
to reconcile those measures with the GATT agreement. The 
Committee saw two possible ways of achieving this (TE 002, 
08.05. 1995, p.5 and T E  011, 06.01.1995, p. 4 et seq): 
1. The waiver provisions of the WTO. Thus, on a case-by- 
case basis, trade measures would be exempted from 
having to comply with G A T T  articles. The North 
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) might serve 
as an example of this approach. NAFTA cites, in Article 
104, three internat ional  environmental agreement 
(CITES, the Montreal Protocol and the Base1 Conven- 
tion) which are expressly stated to  take precedence over 
the NAFTA agreement. This precedence is however 
made subject to  the condition that the state wishing to 
invoke the M E A  as the justification for not complying 
with the NAFTA agreement must choose, from the 
means at  its disposal, the means which are the least 
inconsistent with NAFTA, in a reasonable way and with 
the same efficiency in reaching the environmental goal. 
In respect of existing MEAs, it should not be too 
difficult for the WTO Contracting Parties to reach a 
consensus on a list of "exempted MEAs". But what of 
MEAs that will be concluded in the future? Should the 
granting of a waiver be subject to complying with a list of 
general criteria, to be drafted by the Contracting Parties? 
Would it be better to work on a case-by-case basis? 
Overall, the disadvantage of the waiver approach 
would be that parties negotiating an MEA could not be 
certain that a waiver would eventually be granted, since, 
by definition. the waiver would take place e.u post. 
2. Another possible approach could be a collective inter- 
pretation of the GATT Articles that apply in the context 
of trade and the environment, such as Article XX (b) and 
(g). This, however, might not prove easy to reach. 
Additionally. a collective interpretation does not leave 
any room for aspects of the trade and the environment 
issue that might turn up in the future (unless. of course, 
the parties were to agree a "new" collective interpretation 
in the future). If this approach were to  be adopted. then 
the conditions for the Article XX exceptions to apply, as 
defined in the headnote to the article, would of course be 
withheld. This means, among other matters, that in any 
event. the use of trade measures vis-a-vis non-parties to 
the MEA may not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail. It would not be possible in cczsu 
to use trade measures against non-parties if those 
countries meet the level of environmental protection 
dictated by the MEA. 
Argentina launched an interesting proposal, suggesting a 
two-stage approach (TE 01 1, 06.01.1995, p.6). According to 
this proposal. the pros and cons of both approaches could 
be combined as follows: 
1. In a collective interpretation of Article XX, criteria 
would be defined which, if they were met by an MEA. 
would prinrcz facie make the trade measures included 
compatible with the GATT rules." This would offer the 
obvious advantage to parties negotiating an MEA that 
the (in)compatibility with GATT rules becomes reason- 
ably predictable. 
14. Principle 6 of the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment 
and Development: "The special situation and needs of developing 
countries, particularly the least developed and those most 
environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority. Inter- 
national actions in the field of environment and development 
should also address the interests and needs of all countries". 
15. Demaret, P., op. cit., p.57. 
16. Ibidem. 
17. Argentina proposed four basic criteria: the term "multilateral" 
should be considered in terms of the minimum number of countries 
in the geographical region covered by an MEA that would have to 
be party to it, and the need for MEAs to be open to participation 
by any WTO member. The term "environmental" should cover any 
agreement having an environmental protection objective. even if it 
was not its only objective. Trade measures included in an MEA 
should be shown to be indispensable to meeting its environmental 
objectives. Trade measures should be the least trade restrictive in 
each particular case. 
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2. The second stage would entail a procedure similar to the 
waiver procedure of the GATT, in which each MEA 
would be examined to see if it indeed meets the criteria. 
A last aspect of the issue of MEAs and their (in)compat- 
ibility with international trade law is the problem of defining 
an MEA. The concern is that the international community 
can be favourable towards multilateral initiatives only if 
they are truly multinational, rather than reflecting the 
individual wishes of (developed) countries. disguised as an 
international treaty. 
The European Community has s ~ g g e s t e d ' ~  that only 
international agreements negotiated under the aegis of the 
United Nations, or those in respect of which the negotia- 
tions are open to all Contracting Parties to the WTO, could 
qualify as mult~lateral agreements. The European Commu- 
nity considered such agreements should, in any event, be 
open to all WTO Contracting Parties, under the same 
conditions as the original parties. 
clause). the TREMs need to parallel similar measures vis-i- 
vis domestic products. If this is not the case, then the state 
may try and justify the measures using the exceptions 
provided for in Article XX (b) and (g). In this balancing act, 
principles such as the proximity principle" and the "polluter 
pays" principle may play an important role." 
Export restrictions that are incompatible with GATT 
Article XI might also qualify under the exceptions in Article 
XX (b) and (g). 
A specific concern within the WTO framework, is de 
facto discrimination, by way of differing product norms 
within various c ~ u n t r i e s . ' ~  So far, the GATT has not been 
able to provide an answer to this. 
Currently, the GATT is more concerned with the use of 
trade measures to protect the environment outside a state's 
territory. Participants in the WTO Committee have warned 
against this form of eco-imperialism, without however 
discussing this issue in e.utenso (TE 002, 08.05.1995, p.5). 
But can the WTO require that an international agree- "Extra-territoriality" is a term often used in this context, 
ment have a minimum number of participants to qualify for although it does not always seem to be justified. A state 
an exemption from GATT rules'? This is a delicate question. regulating imports into, or exports from, its territory. to 
On the one hand, it is not up to an international protect the environment, does not exercise extra-territorial 
organisation protecting fair trade to determine how many jurisdiction. The mere fact that the import concerned goes 
participants are needed for an agreement to be useful in 
seeking to solve global environmental problems. On the 
other hand, countries that are directly involved in the 
environmental issue concerned should not be prevented 
from participating in initiatives to deal with the problem. 
Here, the European Community suggested granting 
exceptions to the GATT rules only to those MEAs in which 
a representative number of producers of the source of the 
environmental problem are involved. 
3.3.2.2 TREMs Taken Unilater~zlly 
Although Item 1 of the Agenda extends to unilateral trade 
measures, most discussions so far have concerned MEAs. 
to its territory. and the export leaves from it, gives that state 
enough territorial affiliation with the matter to be compe- 
tent from the public international law point of view. 
On the other hand, if a state were to require firms 
established on its territory, and their foreign branches. to 
abide by certain "green" rules when investing abroad, then 
one could speak of extra-territoria~ity.'~ 
In the context of extra-territoriality and the WTO, the 
two GATT Panels reports on the so-called TunalDolphin 
cases are significant. Both Reports said that a Contracting 
Party to the GATT cannot adopt trade measures to protect 
environmental interests outside its territory if those mea- 
sures (economicallq) force another Contracting Party to 
The international community, as already outlined, is more change its domestic policy. This is consistent with Principle 
favourable towards multilateral initiatives than towards 12 of the Rio Declaration. 
unilateral action. However, not all unilateral actions are 
necessarily arbitrary and disguised protectionism. 
Unilateral action might play an important role as a 
catalyst for global environmental action. for instance. 
bearing in mind the precautionary principle,'9 where there 
is no agreement on the evaluation of the scientific evidence 
available. Likewise, unilateral action might prove necessary 
in the event of unsuccessful negotiations on a multilateral 
agreement (this point was also made by the United States' 
representative, TE 01 1, 06.01.1995, p.3). 
It is not always clear whether a specific measure is a 
unilateral one. For  instance, there is confusion about the 
nature of treaties that give the parties the possibility of going 
beyond what has been explicitly agreed in the treaty. 
Paul Demaret suggests the following criteria of demarca- 
tion." Those measures that are taken to protect an 
environmental goal that has been properly defined in the 
treaty are to be seen as the result of multilateralism. For 
instance, using the example of CITES, measures to protect 
non-threatened animals are not multilateral. 
Unilateral TREMs taken to protect the environment 
within the territory of the state concerned in general are 
compatible with GATT Articles I11 and XI. 
To  be compatible with Article I11 (national treatment 
18. A Compilation of some Working Documents of the Commis- 
sion Services on Trade and Environment, 29 November 1994, p.5 et 
seq. See also TE 011. 06.01.1995, p.5. 
19. See principle 15 of the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on 
Environment and Development: "In order to protect the environ- 
ment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation". 
20. Demaret. P., op.cit.. p.59. 
21. Waste should be disposed of as close as possible to the place 
where it is produced in order to keep the transport of waste to the 
minimum practicable: Court of Justice of the European Commu- 
nities, Case C-2,'90, Commission v Be/giutn (Waste Imports) [I9931 
CMLR 365, at 34, in fine. 
22. Demaret, P., op. cit., p.60 et  seq. 
23. In EC law, this problem has been dealt with in rstenso (articles 
30-36 EEC and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice). The 
European Community seeks not only to establish free trade, like 
the GATT, but also seeks to achieve a real internal market, in 
which there are no frontiers, either physical or c/e fucto. 
24. See Demaret. P., op. cit., p.60. 
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However, this does not resolve all the problems that have 
emerged in the trade and environment context. One of the 
important matters is the question of compatibility with the 
G A T T  of measures taken vis-a-vis products which d o  not 
themselves have a negative impact on the environment, but 
the processes for producing them are damaging. Thus, it is 
not clear what attitude a WTO panel would adopt towards 
trade measures taken against production processes dama- 
ging the common heritage of humankind." 
3.3.2.3 Conclzlsion as to Agenda Item I 
This item is the most ambitious one of the WTO Committee 
on  Trade and the Environment. Both in the WTO 
Committee and in its predecessors, many issues surrounding 
Item 1 have been mentioned. Much of the work done has 
been to try and define the difficulties, rather than suggest 
solutions. 
It is most likely that the report of the Committee to the 
General Council of the WTO Contracting Parties will 
propose setting up a working group on this item alone. 
3.3.3 Transparency 
The EMIT group has done much of the work on the 
provisions of the multilateral trading system on the 
transparency of trade measures used for environmental 
purposes and environmental measures and requirements 
that  have significant trade effects. The idea behind 
transparency is clear. By enabling states to keep themselves 
informed about each other's trade policy, both public and 
private actors are given time to abide by the policy of the 
state concerned and/or to try and persuade the latter to 
change its policy (TE 003, 22.03.1995, p.3). 
Committee members acknowledged that within GATT 
and the WTO side agreements. as well as in international 
agreements, much work has already been done on the 
matter of transparency. 
G A T T  Article X contains a general requirement for the 
publication of trade provisions. The Uruguay Round 
brought about the extension of transparency requirements 
to  certain environmental measures such as  the new 
agreements on Technical Barriers to  Trade (TBT), '~  
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (sPs)'~ and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing ~ e a s u r e s . "  
All impose certain mandatory requirements. 
However, notwithstanding the degree of transparency 
already existing in international trade? two questions 
remained to be answered: first, whether any of the policy 
measures under consideration falls outside the existing 
transparency provisions; and, second, whether measures 
that are covered are subject to a sufficient mix and degree of 
transparency. 
As to the first matter, it was recalled that the EMIT 
group had drafted a list of gaps in the existing transparency 
provisions regarding the trade and the environment issue 
(TE 003, 22.05.1995, p.9). Some of these gaps have been 
filled by the Uruguay Round negotiations. Other issues, 
however, still seem to fall outside the transparency provi- 
sions of the G A T T  and/or of the sectoral agreements. These 
include labelling, packaging and waste handling, as well as 
voluntary measures. 
It was rightly pointed out that some of the trade and 
environment issues might not fall within the scope of the 
trade agreements. This is the case, for instance, with 
voluntary agreements. 
The second question involves a balancing act between, on 
the one hand, trying t o  achieve maximum openness in states' 
trade measures. and. on the other hand, keeping the system 
manageable. In this respect, the suggestion of installing 
national enquiry points, as under the TBT and SPS 
agreements, was welcomed with some caution, since a 
multiplicity of enquiry points, depending on the subject 
matter concerned. might make consultation difficult. 
The delegations agreed that the best way of making 
notification and transparency useful, is by making a n  ex 
ante requirement. which enables manufacturers to adapt 
their products and/or production processes in time. It also 
makes it possible for interested parties to  try and influence 
the final decision. 
One of the suggestions made to keep the system 
manageable is to oblige states to report only those measures 
that will have a significant effect on trade. This might. 
though, prove difficult to realise. Indeed, not only does it 
require consensus on the concept of "significant trade 
e f fe~ t" ,~ '  but it also raises the question of who would be the 
judge of the (non)significance of a n  envisaged trade 
measure. 
3.3.4 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
Much of what has been discussed in the Committee on the 
relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in. 
the multilateral trading system and those in multilateral 
environmental agreements, raises the question of Lhe extent 
to which the WTO can and should be a primary source of 
international law. The GATT and its sectoral agreements 
- 
have been set up to promote and protect fair trade. Does 
this prevent it from having a preponderant voice in 
international environmental law, or rather, given the WTO's 
position (joined by a large number of states), should it have 
a dominant say in areas touching on international trade law? 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism, as it has been 
set up in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
established a unified dispute settlement mechanism that 
applies to all WTO ~ g r e e m e n t s . ~ ~  The DSU introduces 
25. For instance, measures taken against computers the chips of 
which, in some countries, are cleaned with CFKs, thus damaging 
the ozone layer. Obviously, caution must be the guideline when 
discussing the (in)compatibility of this kind of trade measure with 
CATT/WTO rules, first at the level of proving the link between the 
Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) concerned and the 
environmental damage detected. 
26. Article 10 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade. 
27. Article 7 and Annex B of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
28. Part VII (article 25) of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
29. As has been pointed out by India (TE 003, 22.05.1995, p.4). 
what is "significant" for one state might not be significant for 
another. 
30. See TE 003,22.05.1995, p.5. See also Vermulst. E. and Driessen. 
B., "An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System and its 
Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements", Journal of 
World Trade. April 1995, p.131-161. 
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strict time limits in cases where formal dispute settlement is 
requested. Panel findings are adopted automatically by 
WTO members unless they decide by consensus otherwise. 
Appeal is possible to the WTO appellate body. 
Most of the MEAs contain provisions for dispute 
settlement. These provisions are generally less stringent 
than those of the WTO. The Committee distinguished three 
types of dispute involving a TREM: 
1. A dispute between two MEA parties concerning compli- 
ance with MEA requirements and trade measures in which 
one party is said to be in breach of the requirements. 
Here the question is that of the relationship between 
the settlement procedures of the MEA on the one hand. 
and the WTO on the other. For  instance, should recourse 
be had to the WTO dispute settlement procedures if the 
proced~lre of the MEA does not fulfil the wishes of the 
parties concerned, because the procedure is not clear 
enough, or because the parties consider the bodies 
dealing with the dispute under the MEA are not 
competent enough to deal with the dispute? 
Some delegations considered that WTO members 
should maintain their right of submitting to the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism any conflict that might 
arise as a result of an environmental measure having 
trade effects (see the delegation of Colombia, T E  003, 
22.05.1995, p.7). Some participants added that this 
possibility should, however, be limited, for instance by 
requiring that the parties should first exhaust the 
settlement procedure provided in the MEA. This would 
help prevent the WTO proced~~re  from becoming over- 
burdened. 
The contrary opinion was also expressed. Indeed. some 
delegations expressed the view that a WTO panel should 
be limited to considering WTO provisions only, and that 
any resolution o i  a dispute under the WTO could be 
based only on a clear breach of rights and duties under 
the WTO ~ g r e e m e n t s . ~ '  
2. A dispute between :in MEA party and an b1EA non- 
party that is a WTO member. 
This situation, from an international public law point 
of view, is clear. The WTO is the only competent forum 
to settle the dispute. Some delegations proposed co- 
operation agreements between the MEA and the WTO 
competent bodies. to ensure that the MEA's environ- 
mental objective is taken into consideration in the 
settlement procedure (TE 003. 22.05.1995. p.7). However, 
due account is to be taken of the consent of the non- 
MEA party to such a co-operation arrangement. A non- 
MEA party by definition has not joined the agreement, 
and therefore cannot be forced to abide by it "sideways" 
through the WTO. 
3. A dispute on trade and the environment. but the 
environmental problem is not covered by an MEA or 
no party to the dispute is a member of an existing MEA 
covering the problem. 
This has been qualified as being not directly linked to 
the relationship between MEA dispute settlement and the 
WTO. Rather it involves the question of environmental 
expertise within the DSB (Dispute Settlement Body, set 
up by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding). In 
this respect, establishing technical expert groups to assist 
dispute panels, like in the TBT and SPS Agreements, 
might prove useful. 
3.4 Outstanding Matters 
Out of the Agenda of the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment, items 2 ,  3, 6, 8 and 9 still need to be 
addre~sed .~ '  
Stocktaking has been scheduled to be completed by the 
end of 1995. It is to be expected that, at least for some items 
of the Agenda. specific working groups will be established. 
4. Conclusion 
The results of the W T O  Committee on  Trade and 
Environment have not been revolutionary so far. Most of 
the meetings were in fact useful fora for the exchange of 
information and ideas. 
However, in all probability, several working groups will 
be established in which specific issues will be analysed and 
discussed. These groups might define possible solutions in 
those areas where the tension between the protection of the 
global free trade regime and the conservation of the 
environment becomes apparent. 
The setting up and the activation of the WTO Committee 
on Trade and Environment reflects the current mood in 
which the discussion on the "greening" of free trade evolves; 
eilvironmental protection is being defined as an integrated 
element of global free trade. rather than as an objective of a 
different set of international cooperation. This may seem an 
unimportant nuance. In our view, however, it is a qualitative 
difference. 
31. I t  should be added that a dispute between two parties, especially 
in international public law, often has a relevance not just for the 
two parties concerned. A ruling (whether by way of a decision of a 
panel or by an international court) on the treaty concerned often 
stretches beyond the facts of the case concerned. by way of the 
(implicit or explicit) precedent rule. 
32. See supra. 2.2. Agenda of the Committee. Meanwhile, the 
Committee examined the relationships between environmnetal 
policies and WTO services and intellectual property agreements 
(TE 004, 14.08.1995). 
